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BAR BRIEFS
higher schedule in regard to any of the persons whom I have last
named, without at the same time increasing the schedules by like
amounts to every person covered by the policy.
"No man should be allowed to use the public highway and pro-
vide high protection for himself and his friends, or for himself alone,
unless he is willing to provide the same degree of protection for strang-
ers who may be injured by his automobile. Furthermore, he should
not be allowed to take his automobile on the highway unless he fur-
nishes a minimum protection for every one whom it may injure except,
perhaps, himself."
Under Mr. Bird's proposal all automobiles with foreign license
plates would be subject to the law of his state, New Jersey.
REVIEW OF DECISIONS
Pearce vs. Hanlon et als: Plaintiff, a messenger, using motor-
cycle side car, while in performance of regular duties, was struck by
truck of defendants, while such truck was passing another car on the
street. The evidence was rather conflicting, hence, the most important
part of the final decision deals with the examination of witnesses by
the trial Court. HELD: The practice of trial Judges in asking ques-
tions "fairly calculated to elicit the facts and to make the testimony
more definite" is not to be condemned, following State vs. Hazlett, 14
N. D. 490,105 N. W. 617.
Baird, Receiver vs. Keitztnan et als: Note given by K. to M.
Bank was transferred to B. Bank, which became insolvent. Defense
was that note was without consideration, given to M. Bank as a tempo-
rary replacement and held as security while other notes were being col-
lected, collection to be made by one of the defendants. The offer of
proof was rejected, and judgment entered. HELD: Sufficient con-
sideration is shown in the detriment suffered by M. Bank in the release
of notes for collection. The Court quotes 5 Wigmore on Evidence,
2445, "An extrinsic agreement not to transfer an instrument payable
'to order' cannot be effective; for the term 'to order' imports negotia-
bility, and there is no purpose which the term could serve if that ele-
ment were discarded." Re the contention that this was a conditional
delivery: If a delivery is a conditional delivery at all when it is to be-
come effectual upon successful efforts to collect the amount from
others, "such a condition cannot be shown for the same reason that no
other agreement not embraced in the writing and qualifying that which
is embraced therein can be shown. Obviously, if it were possible for
one party to a contract, delivered for the purpose of taking effect, to
establish an agreement outside the writing that upon the happening of a
contingency the written terms of an obligation, absolute in form, were
to-be of no effect, the so-called parol evidence rule would lose much of
its value. There is as much reason why such a condition subsequent,
to be effective, should be contained in the writing as there is for re-
quiring to be incorporated therein agreements or understandings quali-
fying the written obligations in other respects."
SUPREME COURT WRITES "FINIS" IN HANSON CASE
The most controversial embranglement ever to exercise a disturb-
ing influence over the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
has been disposed of for the second time by the Supreme Court, and,
every one ever connected with it hopes, "finally".
BAR BRIEFS
The claim was originally filed about ten years ago, and disallowed.
The time for appeal was permitted to expire. Then an application for
review was made, followed by several investigations and a denial of
reopening. An appeal from an alleged order denying reopening brought
a demurrer, which was sustained in 56 N. D. 525, 218 N. W. 215. This
second appeal was from an order of the Bureau entered July 20, 1929.
During the years that have elapsed since the original injury nine
commissioners of the Bureau have had an opportunity to pass judgment
on the matter at various times: They were: McDonald, Hagen and
Wehe; McDonald, Kitchen, Olsness, Spencer and Elliott; McDonald,
Kitchen, Olsness, Elliott and Livdahl; McDonald, Kitchen, Olsness,
Livdahl and Wenzel; McDonald, Kitchen, Olsness, Wenzel and Kiley.
Commissioner Wenzel was the only one of these nine who ever
voted in favor of an award, but he did not participate in the case until
the Supreme Court had disposed of the first appeal. During the years
1927 and 1928 discussions at Board meetings became rather acrimonious
concerning this case, Commissioner Wenzel, at one time, charging care-
less investigation, misstatement of facts, suppression of evidence and
changing of official records, his memorandum notations being later"expunged" by vote of the Board. A re-investigation was finally or-
dered.
L. J. Siljan, who preceded J. E. Kiley on the Board, was a mem-
ber when the re-investigation was untertaken in 1928, but official ac-
tion was held up until after his resignation from the Board, hence, he
did not appear on the official "vote record."
The appeal just "determined" by the Supreme Court involved
several interesting questions of law. First, Whether a second appeal
would lie under the provisions of Section 17 (396al7) of the Act (the
regular appeal provision); and, Secondly, Whether, upon the exercise
of the powers granted by Section I8 (396ai8) of the Act (the contin-
uing jurisdiction provision), an appeal would lie.
The -Supreme Court appears to have held as many opinions as
there were Judges, but was evidently convinced in one particular,
namely: that the merits of the case entitled the claimant to an award
of some kind in the first instance. How to support such judgment,
without violating every principle of interpretation, seems to have been
the difficulty during the period of Judicial conferring on the case, and
finally resulted in the entry of a per curiam opinion that offers nothing
in the way of precedent, but affirms the guess of Commissioner Wenzel
and the District Court in favor of an award.
The syllabus says: "An appeal lies from final action of the Work-
men's Compensation Bureau denying a claim on the grounds stated in
Section 396a17 of the Workmen's Compensation Law. It is held, for
reasons stated in the opinion, that the passage of a motion denying a
claim on the grounds stated constituted final action within such section."
COMMENDATION FOR A CHANGE
The editorial page of the Fargo Forum of December 21St, 1930,
carried the following item:
"Officials, in the handling of this case (Bannon-Haven) are to be
congratulated upon the fact that they stayed by it until they got the
true facts, and the attorney for Bannon, Mr. A. J. Knox, of Williston,
